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BOOK REVIEWS
STRATEGY AS A BATTLEGROUND
The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective, by Hew Strachan� Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ� Press, 2013� 322 pages� $66�70 (paperback $26�99; Kindle $17�20)� 
About halfway through his account of 
the direction of war, the distinguished 
Oxford military historian Hew Strachan 
makes a seemingly minor point about 
Bernard Brodie, one of the pioneers of 
limited-war theory during the Cold War� 
“Brodie had studied Socratic philosophy 
and had been trained as a historian� 
These were in some sense the traditional 
disciplines of strategic thought,” but in 
the early nuclear age they “were now 
in retreat” (p� 187)� Some might doubt 
that a Socratic approach combined with 
historical inquiry is a foundation of 
strategic thought, or at least of Brodie’s, 
but in truth Strachan thereby described 
his own approach to strategic theory 
and practice as well as anyone possi-
bly could� Strachan, however, is not in 
retreat� He has taken the initiative and 
is very much on the offensive—against 
just about everyone’s sacred cow�
Following Clausewitz directly and per-
haps Socrates’s greatest student, Plato, 
indirectly, Strachan has a dialectical ap-
proach to thinking about strategy, which 
is fundamentally a conversation, the sort 
any war college could only welcome� 
It occurs at many levels, and often the 
interlocutors speak at cross-purposes� 
Most fundamentally it is a conversation 
between theory and practice, one insist-
ing on clarity and therefore abstraction, 
the other on concrete experience�
As the conversation develops, Strachan 
brings in new interlocutors� Virtually all 
the great and many minor strategic theo-
rists and practitioners of the modern era 
have something to say in this dialogue: 
Clausewitz, of course, but also Jomini, 
Mahan, Corbett, Douhet, Billy Mitchell, 
Brodi, Herman Kahn, Mao Zedong; 
Generals Powell, Clark, Petraeus, and 
McChrystal; Admirals Morgan and Mul-
len; and many, many others� While they 
converse with each other, all also are 
engaged in a conversation with practice, 
i�e�, what works and what does not�
That conversation is rooted in a 
deeper one about the relation of the 
past (continuity and change) to the 
present and the foreseeable future 
(contingency), meaning Strachan har-
nesses his vast understanding of the 
past to help us think about the future 
direction of strategy and war� His 
dialogue is always about at least these 
three big questions: What is strategy? 
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Who should direct it? And where and 
how should it be made (p� 215)?
Those looking for a clear answer to the 
first question are likely to be disappoint-
ed� Strachan observes that Clausewitz’s 
“On War contains many references to 
the need for principles and system, but 
never delivers them in a way designed to 
be learnt by the parrots of military cram-
mers and spoon-fed examinees” (p� 203)� 
Neither does Strachan� Like Socrates, he 
is an interrogator� He asks what other 
people, such as the British prime min-
ister and the American president and 
their military and other subordinates, 
mean by policy, grand strategy, military 
strategy, and operations. Like Socrates 
again, he is pretty sure either they do 
not know or their views are one-sided, 
if not misguided, and at best limited 
in utility to a particular moment in 
time� He frustrates his readers as much 
as Socrates does in Plato’s dialogues 
because he never quite defines strategy 
himself� It exists somewhere between 
war’s political purpose and operations 
that purport to achieve it (p� 220)�
As a middle ground between political 
purpose and military action, strategy 
also becomes a battleground between 
those who make policy and those who 
design and execute operations to achieve 
it� Strachan’s focus is often on the disap-
pearance of strategy in this conflict� 
Sometimes it is subsumed by policy, 
which is what he insists happened dur-
ing the Cold War, when the purpose of 
strategy was to ensure that major-power, 
i�e�, nuclear, war did not occur, so the 
use of violence to achieve political 
objectives among major powers against 
each other became unthinkable� This 
also happened after the Cold War, when 
strategy as a means to achieve political 
purposes was nearly extinct (with many, 
in Europe especially, welcoming its 
demise), and operations came to occupy 
the middle ground� This was especially 
true in the United States, though in such 
a narrow way that Strachan ascribes 
fleeting successes in Afghanistan and 
Iraq after 9/11 and 2003 to the triumph, 
i�e�, failure, of merely operational think-
ing� So, in many ways his book becomes 
a discussion of civil-military relations, 
with a powerful critique of the pioneer 
of the field, Samuel Huntington�
Like Socrates, Strachan is willing to 
question taboos� He argues that, in 
both England and the United States, the 
danger of a military leader on a white 
horse coming to power at the expense of 
freedom was vastly exaggerated� Liberal 
principles had taken such deep root in 
the people that a military coup d’état 
was simply inconceivable� What private 
in the U�S� or British military would 
obey an order from a general to arrest 
the president or prime minister? So 
Huntington’s principle of strict separa-
tion between the roles of statesmen and 
generals was not merely unnecessary 
but in many ways counterproductive� 
“The principal purpose of effective civil-
military relations is national security: its 
output is strategy� Democracies tend to 
forget that” (p� 76)� Following Clause-
witz, whom he uses to criticize rather 
than support Huntington, Strachan in-
sists that war is interactive, the realm of 
chance, friction, contingency, and unex-
pected actions from the adversary� And 
war has its own grammar, often leading 
to escalation� War, in other words, has its 
own nature, which politics defies at its 
own risk� A good Clausewitzian might, 
indeed must, try to impose the political 
logic of war on all this, but once the dogs 
of war are unleashed, they tend to make 
havoc—that is, they follow their own 
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direction� As often as not, then, policy 
and strategy are directed by war; they do 
not direct it� Responding to that reality 
requires a dialogue between soldiers and 
politicians—not the subordination of 
one element to the other, but rather their 
“harmonization” (p� 78)� For any kind 
of rationality to be imposed, politics 
must therefore listen to strategy, which 
must listen to war, both in its enduring 
nature and in its changing character� 
All this suggests a far more prominent 
role in the conversation for generals 
and admirals than current norms, often 
violated in practice, tend to permit�
As a student of the American founders 
and the American political tradition, 
this reviewer is not sure Strachan is right 
to challenge the Anglo-American taboos 
as much as he does� As a professor of 
strategy, however, I am certain Strachan  
has captured something vital for un-
derstanding the direction of any war� 
It arises from Clausewitz’s discussion 
of war as more than a true chameleon 
changing its colors from war to war� War 
does have a nature� It is embodied espe-
cially in Clausewitz’s trinity: the relation 
among reason, passion, and creativity 
that exists in any war� But that relation 
changes from war to war� Sometimes one 
element is more important than another, 
which gives an entirely different direc-
tion to a conflict than the one preceding 
or succeeding it� Sometimes the ele-
ments quarrel among themselves� Each 
attempts to give direction to war, and 
the changing historical direction of war 
is very much the result of the conversa-
tion among the parts and the interaction 
of their whole with others� No wonder, 
then, that Strachan does not give us the 
clear and final answers we crave� War 
will not allow them; neither will he� We 
therefore will have to figure the answers 
out for ourselves� A fine way to start is 
by reading this subtle and erudite book�
KARL WALLING
Authority, Ascendancy, and Supremacy: China, 
Russia, and the United States’ Pursuit of Relevancy 
and Power, by Gregory O� Hall� New York: Rout-
ledge, 2015� 188 pages� $145 (paperback $42�95)�
Gregory O� Hall, a professor of politi-
cal science at Morehouse College, has 
taken an acknowledged fact of con-
temporary international relations—the 
dominance of the United States, Russia, 
and China within the international 
system—and developed a compelling 
academic model supporting this�
Hall argues that the Tripolar Conflict, 
Cooperation, and Competition (TC3) 
Framework model reflects the real-
ity of the international system since 
at least the early 2000s� From Central 
Asia to the Middle East and Northeast 
Asia, Hall demonstrates that the United 
States, China, and Russia are locked in 
a complex web of interrelationships that 
increasingly determines the outcome 
of pressing regional, and even global, 
issues� As the traditional economic and 
military advantages of the United States 
decline relative to those of some rising 
powers, the international system will be 
even more defined by the interactions 
of these three dominant global powers�
Hall cogently traces the gradual transi-
tion of the global system following the 
“unipolar” moment that emerged after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s� While the United States 
remains first among equals in numerous 
metrics of national power, the compara-
tive diminution of its own influence 
and the rise of other power centers 
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